basic facts surrounding Ivory coast election of November 28th

I listened to The EU chief observer give report on the elections in Ivory coast castigating the constitutional court and claiming that Quattara won fair and square painfully. this made me juxtapose his statement against the report i have made available on this blog please read and share your comments:

Francis

On December 3 the Ivory Coast’s Constitutional Council determined that Laurent Gbagbo was the winner of the November 28 election runoff, winning 51.45% of the vote to Alassane Ouattara’s 48.55% (see Attachment A, pp. 8-9). The Constitutional Council is the supreme election judicial authority in the Ivory Coast according to the Ivory Coast Constitution, charged with “proclaim[ing] the definitive results of… presidential elections” (see Attachment B, Article 94). Its decisions are final and “not susceptible to any recourse” (see Attachment B, Article 98).

Previously on December 2, the head of the Independent Electoral Commission, Youssouf Bakayoko, announced on French TV from the opposition headquarters hotel that Mr. Ouattara had won the election. The Commission, where representatives from political parties opposed to Mr. Gbagbo and his Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) party dominate by a 20-2 margin by law and appointment (see Attachment C and Attachment D), is limited to overseeing election mechanics and publishing only provisional results “for which the final announcement of results is the exclusive competence of the Constitutional Council” (see Attachment E – Act No. 2004-642 amending Act No. 2001-634 – and also Attachment B, Article 32).

Mr. Bakayoko’s results – announced contrary to the express regulations governing the conduct of that Commission (see Attachment F) – were “certified” as definitive by the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative Y.J. Choi. They have since been cited in an international rush to judgment, and in manner neglecting the Electoral Commission’s constitutionally circumscribed role of determining only provisional election results and the Constitutional Council’s constitutionally supreme role in determining final election results.

The United Nations and other international actors have subsequently rushed to insist that Mr. Ouattara has legally ascended to the Presidency, despite Mr. Ouattara failing to adhere to the constitutionally mandated protocols governing presidential election proclamations, and failing to meet the required obligations governing inaugurations (see Attachment B, Article 39).

On the basis of the Constitutional Council’s decision, which cited election irregularities in 7 provinces (see Attachment A), the Ivory Coast government believes that Pres. Gbagbo is the constitutionally elected president, that the international community has rushed to judgment in declaring Mr. Ouattara the election winner, and that the evidence that lead the Constitutional Council to make its decision has not been fairly evaluated by the international community. Third party and news wire reports validate claims of irregularities, such as:

• Reuters reported that the European Union observer mission issued a statement accusing the Electoral Commission of “unacceptable obstruction.” The statement also noted that “despite a number of requests addressed to the [Electoral Commission], the EU mission continues to face significant obstacles accessing electoral operations” (see Attachment G).
• In those areas where the EU did have access, according to Radio France Internationale/Agence France Presse, UN observer mission head Cristian Peda noted “irregularities, some obstacles on the day of the vote and serious tension.” (see Attachment H) Additional Agence France Presse reports conveyed how “barriers were observed blocking people from voting… including in Gbagbo’s hometown of Gagnoa,” and how “ballots were stolen” (see Attachment I).
• Observer reports from certain African civil society groups confirmed substantial irregularities.
  • The Observer Mission of the African Union noted “serious acts of violence, namely losses of human lives, infringement of physical integrity, intimidations, and abduction attempts and damage to electoral material,” including cases where Mr. Gbagbo’s representatives were “unable to participate in any polling process” in an entire district. The mission documented over 70 polling stations where results were “signed either in the absence of [Mr. Gbagbo’s] representatives, or by themselves under… constraint,” concluded that the ballot process in those locations “could not be held in the transparent way which is essential for the honesty of the ballot,” and noted that the events “constitute[d] an important technicality” in the election. The mission called for “careful assessment from the competent institutions… to determinate their impact on the ballots” (see Attachment J, esp pp i, 2, and 6).
  • A coalition of 21 non-governmental organizations under the umbrella of the Coordination of the Observers from the International Mission of the African Civil Society (COMISCA), reported that “some active members and representatives of the LMP Party were prevented from voting freely, ballot boxes were carried by men in uniform precisely in the Korhogo, Mankono, and Seguela areas, [they] witnessed… manhandling of some persons inside the polling stations, the ballot secrecy was violated and instructions on how to vote were given by some members of the polling stations, some corporal and material damages were recorded as well.” COMISCA ultimately concluded that the circumstances “strongly called into question” “the democratic process” (see Attachment K).
  • CEPECA, The Organization of the emissaries for the promotion of credible elections in Africa, “denounced the violence and barbarous deed perpetuated on [Mr. Gbagbo’s] representatives,” noting among other irregularities that Mr. Gbagbo’s representatives were in places prevented from voting and subject to verbal and physical attacks, that ex-rebels took ballot boxes to unknown places, that “there was stuffing of ballots on a large scale” and “serious infringement of human rights,” and that section agents gave orders favoring the opposition (see Attachment L).
  • An EU-funded domestic coalition of 134 civil society groups under the umbrella of the Convention of Ivorian Civil Society (CSCI), the largest civil society coalition in the Ivory Coast, dispatched over 1,000 monitors to 38% of the polling stations. They noted late and insufficient election material, violence and intimidation at polling stations, destruction of ballots and ballot boxes, multiple voting, barring of voters, barring of monitors, and the insecure transfer of ballots, including attacks on convoys (see Attachment M).
  • The African Civil Society for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, OSCADAE, concluded that “the credibility of the polling was strongly called into question” in some of the stations where, among other irregularities, “candidate representatives, notably from [Mr. Gbagbo’s party], were prevented from doing their duty” and “physical attacks were recorded” (see Attachment N).

There were also eye-witness accounts and video-taped interviews of individuals from the opposition-controlled northern areas documenting violence, voter suppression, and widespread fear, including the murder of a representative from Mr. Gbagbo’s party and the rape and murder by Mr. Ouattara’s supportersof a woman attempting to vote.

A turnout disparity between the Independent Electoral Commission’s results and the Constitutional Council’s findings reflects evidence of fraudulent ballot-stuffing, which was also reported by eye-witnesses and observers, and as was cited as evidence for the Constitutional Council’s decision to declare Mr. Gbagbo the winner (see Attachment A, p. 4).

The ballot count recorded by the Electoral Commission and later relied upon in testimony to the United Nations Security Council by Secretary-General Special Representative to the Ivory Coast Y.J. Choi (see Attachment O) estimated turnout of 81.1%. But this turnout estimate is more than 10% higher than the Constitutional Council’s estimate of 71.28% (see Attachment A, p. 7). The government points out that numerous on-scene observers, such as the European-funded Convention of Ivorian Civil Society (CSCI), estimated a turnout approximating the Constitutional Council’s calculation (see Attachment M, p. 7), a number reflecting the increase in violence as compared to the first round of the election, when turnout was 83.7% (see Attachment M, p. 7).

This material is distributed by Lanny J. Davis & Asociates LLC and DAVIS-BLOCK LLC on behalf of the Government of Cote d’Ivoire.

Is peace a possibility for Cote D’Ivoire in 2011?

In Africa, peace, rebecca sargent's posts, violence on January 3, 2011 at 2:30 am
This past month or so has been a particularly stressful one for me. I have been living in Abidjan, Cote D’Ivoire for most of the past year and have watched as the country has been sinking deeper and deeper into violence and intense propaganda. Sadly, I’ve found I no longer believe a word I read in both local and international news, as I have read “news” that is in direct contrast to what I have seen and heard with my own eyes and ears. The stories seem to be escalating the situation further and further, and I’m finding myself extremely frustrated that everything seems to be so one-sided (either pro-Ouattara or pro-Gbagbo). It hurts me to think I have posted articles and comments that are seen as even slightly defensive of Gbagbo in the international sphere in an effort to elicit some form of balance in the reporting, as I have been (and still am) heavily critical of him. It hurts to try and have discussions with locals within Abidjan in defense of Ouattara, to try and bring reason to fervent Gbagbo supporters. I hate playing the “other-side” game in response to one-sided arguments, but I think it’s important to try to play devil’s advocate with those die-hard supporters who only paint one side of the story. Frankly, I wish both presidents would move on and allow a fresh batch of politicians that aren’t tainted with past violence to step forward to take the country to a more peaceful future, but this is not reality.

I was last here in 2004, during the previous civil war and saw the violence as it spread and resulted in the intense hatred of all things foreign. It was sometimes scary and devastating to watch. I heard many horrific personal stories from friends of the violence they experienced at the time. Despite this, I was ecstatic at the opportunity to come back here. I love this country. I love the mostly kind and friendly people I have encountered here. I love the rich culture and delicious food. I love the countryside, the beaches and the thick, lush forest. I love the way of life here, barring the corruption that sometimes makes things difficult. It’s a beautiful country with a lot of really amazing treasures.

The November 28th presidential elections resulted in a political crisis, with two different entities announcing two different results. Both Presidents were sworn in, in separate ceremonies and the country has been awash with reports of violence and violent-rhetoric ever since. The crisis didn’t really begin here; it has been festering for many years but it is now looking likely to outbreak into civil war, political assassinations or exiles and further inter-group hatreds.

Though I have been writing detailed personal notes throughout this situation, I must admit that I have been fearful to publish anything on the situation in the past few weeks. After writing a critique of the nearly unanimous support for Ouattara (the opposition) demonstrated by the international community on this site and several posts on the subject in a few other forums, I received some rather scary death threats from one person and many comments that broke my non-violence, non-discrimination, non-racism policy. I decided to take a bit of a break from posting on the subject.

The results of the elections sadly, is no longer even really relevant to the discussion. Whoever “really” won did so in a circumstance of intimidation and irregularity that can be attributed to both parties, depending on where one is situated in the country (with Gbagbo-supporters being intimidated mostly in the north, and Ouattara supporters being intimidated mostly in the south). The events that have happened since have only worsened the possibility of the “truth” being told. Propaganda has run wild, with increasingly violent-rhetoric being spread among both state and opposition media. Any probing of results or investigation at this point will be lost behind propaganda I’m afraid.

There has been acts of violence and the country is at real threat of returning to civil war, which it never fully recovered from in the first place. At least 150 are confirmed dead, and probably somewhere closer to several hundred. Dozens (and perhaps many more) have disappeared, and hundreds are said to have been arrested. Many thousands have fled to neighbouring Liberia, escaping violence in the south perpetrated mostly by Gbagbo-supporters, alleged mercenaries and the security forces; and violence in the north perpetrated mostly by Ouattara supporters and the Forces Nouvelles. Further investigation is needed to assess the refugees and their experiences of violence.

Some 120,000 Liberian refugees reside within Cote D’Ivoire, thousands of Burkinabes, and other West Africa refugees; and there have been hints from some sources within the UNHCR that suggest that many of those flooding out of Cote D’Ivoire are these long-term refugees who have long worked the system. They are appearing heavily at the UNHCR border office rather than being evenly distributed throughout Liberia or other neighbouring countries (this is taken from both personal communications with officials and comments made to Chris Blattman from a UNHCR official). I do however believe, that even if these refugees “know how to work the system”, they are still experiencing violence, as foreigners are often scapegoated during domestic troubles.

Regardless of who these refugees are and where they came from, they must be assisted and resettled with caution. The increase of people into Liberia, itself prone to instability, leaves an already burdened population with more mouths to feed and endangers peace in that country as well. Armed groups have been cited crossing borders to intimidate refugee populations and take the conflict to new populations as they do. Instability in the region could easily pass borders if things in Cote D’Ivoire worsen.

Besides the refugees, there are many foreigners with money who have decided to return to their home countries by more planned means (via plane with actual luggage) as their embassies sent messages urging them to quit the country before more violence came. This has had some effect on the local economy, although it appears many major business owners will be staying and instead sending their wives and families back home.

Nearly half the population was already unemployed before the conflict began and the vast majority lives on little more than $1 a day. Those that work often support large numbers of people on their meager salaries. Many workers have been laid off since the crisis, and the prices of food staples has doubled. As the population becomes more food and job insecure, so the risk for conflict increases. Strikes called by Ouattara’s camp affected some of the services of the buses, gbakas (minbuses) and taxis for a few days, but as most of the population is living day to day, long-term or full out striking is extremely unlikely. Most can simply not afford to take the time off without severe repercussions to themselves and their families.

Rallies have been held and marches planned. Ouattara’s march on the RTI television station ended without real success and resulted in much-expected clashes between security forces and protesters. Despite the violence, Ouattara was calling on his supporters to continue the attempt the following day, again without success. He has since repeatedly warned Gbagbo of imminent consequences should he not back down immediately, though it is difficult to administer consequences when one is backed into hiding and the consequences have yet to be seen. The notorious Ble Goude (Gbagbo’s Youth Minister) has been busy rallying up Gbagbo supporters and spinning them into an angry frenzy, readying them for the moment he can unleash them to try to take the Golf Hotel (where the Ouattara camp is currently residing under UN and Force Nouvelles protection) by force. Two major marches planned by Ble Goude have been canceled the night before they were even begun, allegedly to prevent further violence (though they were called using the extreme violent-rhetoric Goude is famous for).

The local political humour paper Gbich has taken the opportunity openly mock both candidates and their behaviours, much to my enjoyment. However, in the serious papers (both state and opposition); violent, inciting rhetoric makes me skeptical of the veracity of anything printed inside and angered that more peaceful dialogue is not the popular option. Rumours of local media intimidation by Gbagbo forces haven’t stopped most opposition papers from writing, as they can still be found daily in many places around the city. I’ve personally been threatened by a pro-Ouattara supporter, so I know that the intimidation definitely goes both ways, but I can also say that I fear writing anything hyper-critical of either candidate should the situation deteriorate further.

On the streets, during the day time, things are pretty normal. The streets and markets are crowded with people again going about their daily business, though people are still cautiously stocking up on supplies and keeping an eye out for any signs of coming danger. The police in many parts of the city have even returned to using radar to ticket speeders. I’ve found no trouble or signs of blatant violence while traveling throughout the city in the past two weeks, except for roadblocks and neighbourhood patrols in a few districts at night. In fact, on New Years eve, I traveled throughout several districts (including both known pro-Ouattara and pro-Gbagbo districts) and saw drunken partying, fireworks and dancing as if nothing was wrong. I couldn’t sleep that night as the music, cheering and fireworks of those partying around my apartment blared in through my windows.

I have detailed some of the local situation and the underlying tensions that exist in this post. I will discuss in further detail some of the proposed “solutions” to the crisis and the effects I see coming from those in the next post.

n Africa, peace, rebecca sargent's posts, violence on January 3, 2011 at 2:30 am

France And The Ivory Coast-The Empire Strikes Back

Currently there is an impasse in the runoff of the Presidential elections in the Ivory Coast. The French-linked and funded electoral commission declared that Allasane Outtara won the election while the Constitutional Court declared incumbent President Gbagbo as the victor.

The ‘international community’ of Western countries, NGOS, UN appeasers, and a variety of Francafrique cowards and bed-wetters support Ouattara even though massive fraud has been demonstrated at the polls in the rebel-held North.

This result should be no surprise to anyone. There has been no effective disarmament of the tinpot rebel warlords of the North and no unification of the country in anticipation of the election. A ‘security’ dividing line between the North and the South has been maintained by the occupying French forces pretending to be U.N. troops. Even so-called peacemakers like Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso pretend to be neutral. Campaore, an unindicted war criminal with a track record of subversion, arms smuggling and war profiteering in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Cost is somehow portrayed as a neutral.

When arms were being shipped to the West African wars by Chirac and Ghadaffi they arrived at their destinations after having passed through the hands of Campaore and Tandja (who both profited on the deliveries), Ouattara, known as the “Father of the Rebellion” in the Ivory Coast was sustained by operating from a safe haven in Burkina Faso when he was not busy maintaining his close personal ties to Sarkozy’s first wife in Paris. There was no mystery about the Ouattara-Campaore joint effort. Several hours of tapes exist which recorded the meetings called by Campaore in Burkina Faso which garnered support for Ouattara among the Northerners and actively plotted with two French military officers sent from Paris to attempt coups against the Gbagbo Government.

Voter fraud and deception was the rule in the North for over seven years. Even when the AU originally appointed Banny as the interim Prime minister ad Thabo Mbeki as the mediator the frauds persisted. President Mbeki visited the Ivory Coast and invited the warring factions to meet with President Gbagbo in Pretoria where two sets of agreements were made. These Pretoria Agreements achieved a resolution of most of the outstanding issues between the two sides, because President Gbagbo made concessions to achieve these ends. The most important point made in Pretoria was that there would be disarmament of the rebels.

This was, indeed, a requisite of the original cease-fire agreement at Linas-Marcoussis , Article 3 (g) “In order to contribute to restoring security of persons and property throughout the national territory, the Government of National Reconciliation will organise the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all forces. It will ensure that no mercenaries remain within the country’s borders.”

Some links showing the protests:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fsgZ75aCr2A

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2rKMEAzpFyc

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zcOmw624suM

Thank you